Iran's policy toward the Kurdish issue in Iraq 1963-1970

Abstract

The subject of Iran’s policy toward the Kurdish cause in Iraq is one of the significant subjects because it has both a positive and negative impact on the Kurdish question in Iraq. Noticeably, this policy was changing in the course of this research depending on the level of relations between the two states. For instance, Iran, at the outset of AbulakareemQasim’s reign, was suspicious about Qasim’s government and had worries from it because the latter was approaching the Former Soviet Union and also due to the emergence of the Iraqi Communist Party and the stance of its government on the national rights of Kurds in Iraq.  After the eruption of the Aylul Revolution of 1961, Iran endeavored to use the new developments on the Iraqi arena into its advantage by supporting the Kurdish Revolution both logistically and financially with the aim of pressuring and undermining Qasim’s government because Iran was afraid of the revolution to extend to the Kurdish territory inside Iran which was to cause internal destabilization. 

Iran was always trying to fail any truce between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi government and was pushing some figures to refuse the truce like what happened in 1964 when an armistice was signed between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish leadership but Iran pushed a group of the KDP Politburo members to reject the armistice of 1964 to destabilize the order in Iraq. Furthermore, Iran tried very hard to create troubles and crises for the Iraqi regime after Al-Baath came to power; it tried everything in its power to bring failure to the March, 11^th Declaration of 1970 (Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement) between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leadership by tempting the Kurdish leadership but their attempts did not materialize.